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Interpretive habit is strengthened by cognitive bias
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We investigated the nature of the memory mechanisms underlying cognitive bias modification by
applying Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation procedure to responses during the transfer task. In the two
training conditions (negative and benign), students imagined themselves in 100 ambiguous scenarios,
most with potentially negative resolutions; the ambiguity was resolved in a consistently negative or
benign direction by completing the fragment of a final word. Control participants completed nonambiguous, non-emotional scenarios. Next all participants responded on a final training block, where half
of the scenarios were completed negatively and half benignly. Transfer was assessed by examining choices
in the completion of test scenarios when participants were instructed to respond in the same way as they
had to a final-block training scenario that was situationally similar. Benign training facilitated correct
responding to benign analogues and impaired correct responding to negative analogues. Performance in
the negative-training and control conditions was similar. Process-dissociation procedures revealed that
this newly established habit and not controlled recollection provided the basis for transfer.

Keywords: Cognitive bias modification; Anxiety; Process dissociation; Habit; Transfer.

A negative interpretation bias is a tendency to
interpret ambiguous events as emotionally negative or threatening. Consider the example of two
students who pass a professor walking across
campus. To the student with an emotionally
negative bias, the unsmiling nod from the professor means dislike or dismissal; to the student
without such a bias, the nod indicates a greeting
from someone deep in thought. Anxious individuals are more likely to make negative interpretations of events with ambiguous meaning
(Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews,
1991) and possibly to do so habitually, without
apparent awareness of alternative possibilities.
To understand the processes responsible for
interpretation biases associated with emotional
disorders, biases have been experimentally in-

duced in non-anxious individuals via a procedure
called cognitive bias modification (CBM; see
Hertel & Mathews, 2011, for review). CBM is
achieved through numerous trials that encourage
the research participant to resolve ambiguity
consistently in one or another direction. One
type of CBM paradigm, developed by Mathews
and Mackintosh (2000), presents descriptions of
scenarios that are emotionally ambiguous until
the final word. For example: For the last few weeks
you have noticed that your hearing seems worse
than it was. You decide that you should have your
ears examined. After a thorough check, the doctor
says that your hearing will rapidly: [word fragment]. When this scenario occurs within a negative training condition of CBM, the upcoming
word fragment corresponds to a word that re-
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solves the scenario in a negative manner (e.g.,
deteriorate). When the scenario occurs in a benign
condition, its ambiguity is resolved in a nonthreatening manner (e.g., with a fragment for
recover).
Following a large number of consistently
valenced training trials, success in establishing a
bias is assessed by examining the effects of
training on performance in transfer tasks. Fartransfer tasks reveal effects on reactions to
stressful events and are used to argue that
cognitive biases indeed establish and maintain
anxious states (in the case of negative training) or
can be modified to reduce anxiety through benign
training (e.g., Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, &
Rutherford, 2006; Woud, Holmes, Postma,
Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2011). An example of
a far transfer stressor is the presentation of video
footage from fires and other disasters involving
people who ultimately survive. Near-transfer
tasks, however, examine whether the bias in
question will occur subsequently in the resolution
of new ambiguous events that bear some similarity to training (e.g., new ambiguous scenarios).
The nature of the near-transfer process is the
topic of the present research.
A common assumption is that CBM procedures, like real-life experiences, train habitual
ways of responding in new situations*ways that
do not depend on the explicit recollection of
training events. This assumption seems to have
been based on observations that naturally occurring biases in anxious states are not made with
deliberate retrospection of prior events but seem
to occur without the awareness of alternative
possibilities until, for example, they are brought
to awareness by therapists. No doubt the habit
assumption also derives from the routinisation of
the procedure in the training phase of CBM
experiments; repetitive practice is crucial to the
establishment of new habits. By this reasoning, the
transfer task serves as a sort of implicit test of
memory or concept learning. It is unlikely, however, that any test of memory or concept learning
is process pure (Jacoby, Baker, & Brooks, 1989).
The current application of prior experience occurs
as some mixture of habitual associative processes
and more controlled procedures that focus attention retrospectively. By making assumptions
about how habit and controlled recollection concomitantly contribute to performance on a transfer task, it is possible to estimate them separately
and then to examine the effects of experimental
manipulations on each type (Jacoby, 1991).

We have taken a process-dissociation approach
in the current experiment, as well as in two
previous experiments that used a different set of
instructions (Hertel, Vasquez, Benbow, &
Hughes, 2011). Both approaches adjust the typical
CBM interpretation paradigm in a way that
permits the use of process dissociation procedures. Hertel et al. derived estimates of recollection and habit from performance on transfer
scenarios following inclusion and exclusion instructions. On inclusion trials participants were
asked to resolve ambiguity by responding in the
same way as they had responded to a similar
situation encountered at the end of the training
phase. On exclusion trials they were asked to
remember such a scenario but to respond in the
opposite way (with a negative or benign interpretation). The recollection estimates derived
from this approach were sensitive to training;
compared to both negative training and control
conditions, benign training proactively interfered
with the recollection of negative resolutions
encountered towards the end of training. This
was an interesting, and potentially applicable
outcome concerning recollection, found in both
experiments, but the lack of training effects on
estimates of habit ran counter to common assumptions. We therefore sought an experimental
approach that would de-emphasise the demand
for controlled recollection, believing that effects
on estimates of habit would emerge under such
conditions. Next we describe our new adjustment
to the CBM paradigm and then the current
application of process-dissociation equations,
modelled on the congruence/ incongruence paradigm used by Jacoby, Debner, and Hay (2001).
In our design the main training phase typified
CBM experiments (e.g., Mackintosh, Mathews,
Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006) but also included 16 additional scenarios at the end of
training, half of which were resolved with a
negative and half with a benign ending, regardless
of the training condition. (We refer to these
slightly different training phases as Training A
and Training B, and schematise the design in
Figure 1.) For the ensuing transfer phase 16 new
scenarios were each created to be situationally
analogueous to one of the Training-B scenarios.
The following examples illustrate the match.
(In Training B) You have agreed to baby-sit
while your neighbour goes out for the evening. You
have put their daughter to bed but she takes some
time to settle down. An hour later you go in to
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Training A: Ambiguous scenarios
Negative
resolutions

Benign
resolutions

Control scenarios
Nonambiguous and
nonemotional
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B are congruent (and benign in our example).
When participants respond correctly to transfer
scenarios under congruent conditions, they do so
to the extent that they recollect the Training-B
outcome or, in the absence of its recollection, to
the extent that the corresponding habit was
trained. Thus:

Training B: Ambiguous scenarios


P correct

8 negative & 8 benign resolutions

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the design. Circles
represent scenarios; lines represent the situational similarity
between Training-B and transfer scenarios.

check on her and find she is no longer: [fragment
for crying or conscious].
(In transfer) A neighbour asks you to look after
her little girl while she visits a friend in the
hospital. The five-year-old cries when her mother
leaves but then seems happy to play alone in your
garden. After ten minutes you go out and she is:
[choice between gone and fine].
The important feature that distinguished Training-B and transfer scenarios, as is always the case
in this CBM/scenario paradigm, was the presence
of forced resolutions in the training phase and
their absence in the transfer phase. In our transfer
phase two alternative endings followed each
scenario, and participants were instructed to
choose the ending corresponding to the way that
they had previously responded to a similar situation. This instruction does encourage a retrospective approach to resolution but does not
emphasise recollection to any greater degree
than does the typical transfer task used by
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000; see also Tran,
Hertel, & Joormann, 2011; Woud et al., 2011). It
was also the instruction employed on inclusion
trials in the experiments by Hertel et al. (2011),
with the difference being that exclusion instructions were not used in the current task.
To explain how process dissociation equations
are devised to obtain estimates of the role of habit
and recollection in this transfer task we use the
benign condition as illustration, although the
equations would be the same in the negative
condition analogously. The first assumption applies to responding when Training A and Training

(1)

where R represents the contribution of recollection and H the contribution of habit. On other
trials where Training A and Training B are
incongruent we are interested in the probability
of responding incorrectly with a benign choice. In
this case the probability of incorrectly choosing a
benign alternative when the similar Training-B
scenario was resolved negatively is equal to the
probability that the participant responds with a
‘‘benign habit’’ in the absence of recollection.
(The incorrect choice would not be made, given
recollection). Thus:

P incorrect


benign

¼ ð1  R Þ  H

(2)

The probabilities of being correct and incorrect in
choosing benign alternatives can be estimated in
practice by the respective observed proportions
of these choices. By subtracting Equation 2 from
Equation 1 with those proportions in place, an
estimate of recollection is obtained:

R ¼ prop correct benign  prop incorrect benign (3)
In other words, recollection involves the correct
rejection of benign alternatives as well as their
correct endorsement. Last, the estimate of habit is
calculated by substituting the estimate of recollection into Equation 2.


Task: Respond as you did to a similar situation.

¼ R þ ð1  R Þ  H



Transfer: 16 Training-B analogs + 8 new (guessing) items


benign

^ ¼ðprop incorrect
H
benign Þ=ð1  RÞ

(4)

The habit of responding in a benign fashion, of
course, can exist on pre-experimental grounds for
someone in any of the training conditions, but is
predicted to be stronger in the benign condition
due to training.
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In summary, process-dissociation procedures
operationalise the assumption that habit and
recollection jointly determine responding during
the transfer phase of interpretation training. This
analysis is roughly parallel to the one made by
Jacoby et al. (2001) for the purpose of examining
memorial differences associated with ageing. Our
analysis is done for the purpose of examining the
training effects in the CBM paradigm. The training phase can, on both logical and empirical
grounds, affect one’s ability to recollect individual
situations; however, the implicit but compelling
assumption of CBM approaches is that training
strengthens interpretive habit. In using these new
instructions with less emphasis on cognitive control we hypothesised that, compared to a control
condition, both negative and benign training
would strengthen estimates of those respective
habits, although we anticipated that effects might
obtain only in the benign condition as had
previous been the case (Hertel et al., 2011).
Like Jacoby et al. (2001), but unlike Hertel
et al. (2011), we measured guessing in this
experiment, by including new test items that did
not match up with any Training-B scenarios
(see Figure 1). Jacoby et al. (2001) showed that
performance on guessing items, assumed to be a
relatively pure measure of habit in their experiment, corresponded to their estimates of habit.
We therefore expected that habit estimates would
not differ significantly from the proportion of
guesses. The value of this correspondence for us
was that guessing items closely represent transfer
items in typical CBM experiments where there is
no situational analogy between training and
transfer scenarios. Thus, if estimates of habit
correspond to performance on guessing trials,
the typical presumption regarding the training
of habit by CBM procedures is more firmly
supported.

METHOD
Participants and design
Participants were 72 undergraduate students at
Trinity University, pre-screened during their psychology classes to recruit only those with midrange scores (34 to 47) on the trait form of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger,
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Students whose scores fell in the first and fourth
quartiles were excluded for ethical reasons and to

provide ‘‘room’’ for anxiety scores to reduce
following training (see MacLeod, Rutherford,
Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). The
students were randomly assigned to the negative,
benign, or control training condition (with the
constraint of balancing gender and trait scores)
and to one of six conditions for counterbalancing
materials with (1) their role during the Training-B
phase (negative, benign, or missing) and (2)
position of the correct alternative during transfer
testing (left or right). The final sample of 72
included replacements for 10 students whose data
were either incomplete or set aside due to
experimenter error (3 students), comprehension
problems (3 students), especially large numbers of
errors in the training phase (3 students), and
previous knowledge of the experiment (1 student). Trait-anxiety scores averaged 40 in each
training condition.

Materials and procedure
Training A. In the negative and benign conditions participants read 20 filler scenarios and 80
training scenarios, most of which were adapted
from Mackintosh et al. (2006). Each training
scenario was identical in the negative and benign
conditions and remained ambiguous until the
final word. For example: It is your elderly mother’s
birthday, and you are going round with some
presents. You have the key so you let yourself in,
and call out but get no reply. Looking into the
kitchen you see she is on the . . . Participants were
asked to read each scenario as if they were the
person in the situation and then to anticipate the
final word before pressing the spacebar to reveal
a fragment to be completed (e.g., f-oor for floor or
ph-ne for phone). Immediately after typing the
word to complete the fragment, participants
respond to a ‘‘yes or no’’ question designed to
measure comprehension (e.g., Is your mother
talking to someone?), which would be answered
differently, depending on the training condition.
The order of presentation was randomised within
blocks, each of which contained two fillers and
eight training scenarios. An instructional example
was discussed at the outset. Fillers were selected
from the control scenarios.
In the control condition participants read 100
unambiguous, emotionally neutral scenarios, completed word fragments, and responded to comprehension questions. For example: You begin
reading a book that you recently found around

COGNITIVE BIAS MODIFICATION

your house. One afternoon you are reading it while
sitting in your recliner. You start to feel hungry so
you put the book . . . The spacebar press revealed
the fragment (do-n for down), followed by the
question (Are you planning to take a nap?).
Scenarios were randomly ordered.
Pilot study for Training-B and test scenarios. We
constructed 24 additional pairs of ambiguous
scenarios with the final word missing*one member of each pair to be assigned to the Training-B
phase and the other member to the transfer test*
and gave them to 35 volunteers to complete with
the first word that came to mind. No volunteer
completed both members of any pair, and no one
participated in the main experiment. Their responses were categorised as benign or negative
completions. For counterbalancing purposes in
the main experiment the scenarios were organised
into six sets of four pairs, and sets were balanced
according to the mean proportion of each type of
completion. The mean benign completion rate
ranged from .56 to .64 for the four scenarios in
each set and training/test combination (M .60).
Training B. In this phase of the main experiment all participants were presented with 1
scenario from each pair in four of the sets (16
scenarios in total); the scenarios from two sets
were accompanied by the fragment for the
negative resolution and the scenarios from
the other two sets by the benign fragment. The
corresponding scenarios final two sets were withheld from the training phase, so that the remaining member of the pair could be used on the
transfer test as a control for guessing. Across
counterbalancing and training conditions, each
scenario was equally likely to be resolved as negative or benign, or to be missing. The 16 Training-B
scenarios were presented in a randomised-block
order. Each block contained two negative and two
benign resolutions. Participants were told to read
each scenario carefully because questions would
follow.
Transfer test. Materials for the test phase
consisted of all 24 second-member scenarios
from the six sets, 16 of which were situationally
similar to the Training-B scenarios and 8 of which
were novel. They were presented in randomised
blocks of six scenarios, one from each set. We told
the participants that each scenario was situationally similar to one of the scenarios they just
finished reading in the previous phase: ‘‘For
example, if you had just now viewed a scenario
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about watching a movie, then there would be
another scenario about watching a movie in this
upcoming set.’’ Participants were asked to resolve
each scenario in the same way that they resolved
the similar scenario in the previous phase and
then to press the spacebar to reveal two possible
completions (with the position of the correct
choice counterbalanced with valence). They chose
by striking a key on the number pad (1 for left
and 3 for right).
Other procedural features. Participants completed mood forms indicating their current state on
visual-analogue scales of depressedhappy, tense
relaxed, pessimisticoptimistic, and distressed
not-distressed at three points during the session:
prior to the training phase, after the test phase, and
after the presentation of short video clips of real,
potentially life-threatening situations (Wilson et al.,
2006). Participants also completed the state version
of the STAI after the third mood form. None of
these measures revealed statistically significant differences associated with training and therefore they
are not described further.

RESULTS
Proportion of correct choices on the
transfer test
The first analysis addressed the question of
whether training affected correct performance
on the transfer test: choice of the negative
alternative when the similar Training-B scenario
had been negative and the benign alternative
when it had been benign. Proportions were
submitted to a mixed-design analysis of variance
(ANOVA), with a between-participants factor for
training condition (negative, benign, or control)
and a within-participants factor for valence of
completion word in Training B (negative and
benign). As the means in Table 1 illustrate, the
interaction was significant, F(2, 69) 6.43, MSE
.079, p .003, g2p ¼ :16. It was followed by tests of
simple main effects of Training-A condition within
each type of Training-B completion.
The proportion of correct negative choices
differed according to training, F(2, 69) 4.58,
MSE.078, p .010, g2p ¼ :12. With the significance level set at .05 (for each set of post-hoc tests
in this report), Newman-Keuls tests revealed that
benignly trained participants chose correct negative alternatives less frequently than did those in
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TABLE 1
Mean (SD) proportion correct during transfer, estimates of
recollection and habit, and proportion of guesses

Proportion correct
Benign resolutions
Negative resolutions
Estimates of recollection
(for both types of B
scenarios)
Estimates of habit
Incorrect benign/
(1R)
Incorrect negative/
(1R)
Proportion guesses
Benign guesses
Negative guesses

.67 (.18)
.55 (.27)
.21 (.29)

Benign
training A Controls

.76 (.18)
.35 (.25)
.11 (.18)

.58 (.27)
.56 (.31)
.15 (.38)

Recollection
Habit

0.8

Mean Estimates

Negative
training A

1
0.9

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Negative

.53 (.27)

.72 (.22)

.50 (.29)

.47 (.27)

.28 (.22)

.50 (.29)

.59 (.23)
.41 (.23)

.77 (.23)
.23 (.23)

.61 (.28)
.39 (.28)

Benign

Control

Training

Figure 2. Mean estimates of recollection and habit in
responding to test scenarios with benign choices. (Error bars
represent one standard error.) Estimates of recollection in
responding with negative choices are identical; estimates of
habit in responding with negative choices are reciprocal of the
depicted estimates.

n24.

the other two conditions, whose performance did
not differ significantly. Thus benign training
proactively interfered with memory for negative
resolutions, but negative training did not facilitate
it. The training conditions also differed in the
proportion of correct benign choices, F(2, 69) 
4.11, MSE .046, p.020, g2p ¼ :11. According to
Newman-Keuls tests, participants in the benign
condition chose more correct benign alternatives
than did those in the control condition, but not
more than those in the negative condition (who
did not differ from controls). Thus negative
training did not cause interference, but benign
training facilitated correct choice.

Estimates of recollection and habit in
transfer
The next set of analyses was performed on
estimates of recollection and habit, obtained
through process-dissociation equations 3 and 4,
to determine the basis of facilitation and interference in the benign condition, reported above.
Forced choice between the negative and benign
alternatives constrains the analysis to just one
type of alternative. Mean estimates for both types,
however, are reported in Table 1 to facilitate
comprehension of the consequences of the redundancy for each measure. Figure 2 depicts
mean estimates of recollection and habit when
congruence and incongruence are viewed from
the perspective of benign training.

Recollection. Estimates of recollection for benign items (calculated as the proportion of
incorrect benign responses subtracted from the
proportion of correct benign responses) were low
and did not differ as a function of training
condition, p .49. Exactly the same means obtain
in calculating recollection of negative resolutions
from the perspective of congruence and incongruence with negative training.
Habit. Estimates of the habit to interpret in
benign ways were calculated as the proportion of
incorrect benign responses divided by (1  R), or
the proportion of incorrect benign responses
adjusted by the absence of recollection. The
training effect was significant, F(2, 69) 4.76,
MSE .070, p .010, g2p ¼ :12. Estimated habit to
make benign interpretations was higher following
benign training than in each of the other two
conditions according to Newman-Keuls tests.
(Reciprocal means result from estimating ‘‘negative’’ habit, as shown in Table 1.)

Guessing on the transfer test
The proportions of benign resolutions on guessing
trials were examined according to training condition. Missing analogues in training, these trials
more closely conform to the typical transfer
scenarios. The training effect was significant,
F(2, 69) 3.43, MSE.062, p.038, g2p ¼ :09.
Means are reported in Table 1. Newman-Keuls
tests revealed that benign training produced more
benign guesses than either of the other two
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conditions. To examine whether habit estimates
and guessing proportions were similar, we
omitted the control data (due to the absence of
ambiguity during training). The two measures
were non-significantly different, p .182, and
any tendency towards difference was similar in
the two training conditions, as indicated by the
non-significant interaction of training condition
with measure, p.835.

Training errors
The proportions of errors in resolving the fragments in Training B were infrequent (M .02,
SD .05) and did not differ according to training,
resolution valence, or their interaction, p .22.
Errors in resolving fragments during training
were also infrequent (M .01, SD .02). However, the proportion of comprehension errors
during Training A was relatively high1 and varied
significantly with condition, F(2, 69) 4.99,
MSE .005, p .009, g2p ¼ :13. Newman-Keuls
tests revealed that the error rate in the negative
training condition (M .14, SD .08) was significantly higher than in the control (M .08, SD 
.06) and benign condition (M .10, SD .06),
which did not differ significantly. However, this
error rate was not significantly correlated with
any of the other performance measures, p.25.

DISCUSSION
This experiment produced three important findings. First, benign training facilitated responding
to benign analogues and impaired responding to
negative analogues, but negative training failed to
have comparable effects. Second, the basis of this
transfer effect from benign training emerged in
estimates of habit, obtained through processdissociation procedures (Jacoby et al., 2001), but
not in estimates of recollection. Third, the pattern
of habit estimates corresponded to the pattern of
performance on trials in which guessing was the
only means of responding. This third outcome
supports the independence claim regarding habit
and recollection (see Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012).
Moreover, finding the same pattern in guessing as
in habit estimates allays potential concern about
1
A review of the comprehension questions revealed that
the answers we had selected for several questions were not
exclusively correct in the direction assumed.
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the validity of our approach; guessing trials are
comparable to typical transfer trials because there
is no situational match.

Accuracy in near transfer
In two previous experiments conducted with a
similar paradigm, Hertel et al. (2011) found
impairments in responding to negative analogues
following benign training, impairments that they
interpreted as proactive interference from benign
training in remembering subsequent negative
events, but they found only a non-significant
trend in facilitating responding to benign analogues. The present results replicated the proactiveinterference effect and obtained a significant
facilitation effect. However, one subsidiary motivation for the design of the present experiment
was the goal of determining whether negative
training would exert corresponding interference
effects on responses to benign situations; Hertel
et al. had not included that combination of
conditions. Its inclusion in this design, however,
produced no evidence of interference from negative training in remembering benign resolutions
as well as no facilitation for negative resolutions.
(This lack of facilitation was also found in
Experiment 1 from Hertel et al.) Those outcomes
resembled performance in the control condition,
which did not differ from chance.
More generally, whether effects are achieved
by benign or negative training likely depends on
pre-experimental tendencies towards one or the
other bias; our participants’ scores on the STAItrait form were higher than is typical for student
samples, so perhaps their biases were similarly
elevated at the start and therefore were more
malleable to training in the benign direction.
Worth considering in future investigations is
the possibility that moderately anxious students
are motivated to reject negative-bias training.
This possibility is consistent with the higher
comprehension-error rates in the negative condition, their slightly higher (but non-significantly
so) accuracy rates for benign analogues, and the
lack of far-transfer effects on measures of emotion. For the time being, however, this suggestion
merely reflects our guess about the absence of
evidence for negative interpretation training,
evidence often produced through CBM (see
Hertel & Mathews, 2011) although there are
exceptions that fail to show negative effects with
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physically threat (e.g., Mackintosh et al., 2006,
Exp. 1).
A possible account of the proportion correct
results is the suggestion that participants explicitly
respond on the basis of the overall gist of their
training (prior to the Training-B scenarios) instead of their memory for specific scenarios.
Explicit awareness of the direction of training
can account for transfer effects in CBM experiments (Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007)
and can be seen as clinically instrumental in
changing bias. Our experiment did not evaluate
the extent of such awareness. If it had been the
primary mechanism for responding, however,
we would expect strong effects in the negative
training condition, because those outcomes
were quite salient. The correspondence of performance in the negative and control conditions,
even on guessing trials, therefore argues against
this account, although it is possible that participants were aware of the nature of their training.
It is also important to consider that the effects
of overall gist can itself be understood in terms of
habit or explicit recollection. As such, an overall
gist account begs the question that we sought to
answer by using process-dissociation procedures.

Mechanisms of CBM: Habit versus
recollection
The main purpose in conducting this experiment
was to investigate the basis of near transfer. Did
variations in training affect participants’ habitual
tendencies, their controlled recollection of analogous scenarios, or both? Hertel et al. (2011)
found training effects only on the recollection
of Training-B resolutions, whereas we found
effects only on estimates of habit. We turn now
to a discussion of these differences.
On half the test trials in the experiments by
Hertel et al. (2011), habit and recollection were
placed in opposition to each other by means of
‘‘exclusion’’ instructions (Jacoby, 1991). Participants were asked to remember the way they had
responded to very similar situations in the training phase and then to respond differently (akin to
what therapists might instruct their clients to do).
Habit would lead them to erroneously respond in
the same way as previously, and recollection
would lead them to respond differently. In both
experiments reported by Hertel et al., recollection
of negative outcomes was impaired by benign

training, but the habit to respond in a benign
direction was unaffected. In the current experiment we chose a procedure that circumvented the
instruction to oppose prior experience and thereby hoped to increase errors in its use. More errors
expand the range within which experimental
variables such as training valence can exert their
effects on habit (with error as numerator).
The elimination of exclusion instructions in the
present experiment seemed to have reduced
controlled recollection in general, compared to
the estimates obtained by Hertel et al. (2011).
Moreover, asking participants to respond in the
same way as they had previously responded is
certainly an instruction more similar to typical
CBM-interpretation instructions than is the exclusion instruction. We therefore suggest that the
current procedure permits clearer inferences
about the processes that are typically invoked
by CBM: Benign training strengthens the habit to
interpret in non-negative ways and thereby impairs habitual negative biases. And although
participants responded with the benign choice
correctly more often that incorrectly,2 the low level
of recollection suggests that a carefully attentive
focus on the past was not engaged by the instruction
to respond in the same way as previously. This
interpretation of the difference between the current
and previous experiments obviously has not yet been
tested. Yet, although there are differences between
the samples and procedures of the two experiments,
we calculated estimates of recollection from only
the inclusion trials in Experiment 2 of the previous
report, using the congruence reasoning from the
current experiment. The estimate was much higher
(M.42 vs .13 in the same training conditions of the
current experiment). This difference (p B.001) suggests that inclusion trials are also affected by the
degree of control required during exclusion (also see
Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova, & Rhodes, 2005). Moreover, we stress the common thread between the two
sets of findings. Benign training makes either habitual
or controlled interpretation less negative, depending
on the degree to which cognitive control is invoked.
Our procedural analysis rests on the assumption that habit and controlled recollection operate
independently in our version of CBM. The preceding suggestion that the detection of habit
effects depends on the degree of cognitive control
might be compared to the case in which efforts to
2
Recollection estimates were significantly above zero in
both training conditions, pB.005; the control condition
produced a non-significant trend, p .066.
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bring a normally automated motor skill under
intentional control succeeds in disrupting it. High
degrees of cognitive control seem at the very least
to provide boundary conditions for habitual
responding by outshining habit. However, the
present instructions and experimental features
were designed to achieve conditions for independence and met that test by virtue of similarities of
habit estimates to guessing. In future attempts to
investigate CBM mechanisms, other assumptions
about the relation between habit and control
could characterize situations that are designed
differently (see Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012). Our
primary goal is to encourage such procedural
analyses. Truths arising from the use of different
tasks and assumptions might even carry differential
implications for clinical treatment.

Clinical implications
For individuals experiencing certain anxiety disorders (e.g., Generalised Anxiety Disorder or
Generalised Social Phobia), treatment addresses
biases in the interpretation of ambiguity. Moreover, CBM procedures have recently been developed (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008). A reasonable
speculation about attempts to modify such biases
is that they sometimes invite controlled reflective
focus on past instances of bias, with the encouragement to now respond differently (exclusion
instructions), and they sometimes encourage the
practice of new habits in old situations. When
cognitive control is minimised (as it is in our
current report and probably in typical everyday
experience), the trained habit of making benign
interpretations determines future responses to
ambiguity. And although our transfer task occurred shortly after training, the results tempt us
to be confident that more enduring training
effects also rest on changes in habit, because
controlled recollection should be weakened by
longer retention intervals. Alternatively, when
recollection is occasionally sought by engaging
higher levels of cognitive control, benign training
should still prove useful as a means of establishing
proactive interference in the controlled recollection
of negative interpretations.
One can imagine other clinical situations in
which controlled and habitual influences are
less independent of each other. In cognitivebehavioural therapy, for example, negative
thought records sometimes reveal a primacy of
negative interpretation, followed by evaluation of
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confirming or disconfirming evidence. When cognitive control operates in this kind of generate/evaluate
model, it operates with difficulty. In other words,
the training of new habit might trump clinical efforts to encourage re-interpretation or insight. Thus
process-oriented laboratory analogues of clinical
practice offer the possibility of increasing treatment
efficacy or, at least, understanding differential
efficacy with greater precision.
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